Pragmatic ambiguity and Kripke’s dialogue against Donnellan

Authors

  • Carlo Penco Universidade de Genova

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25247/P1982-999X.2019.v19n1.p103-134

Keywords:

Assertion. Charity Principle. Definite Descriptions. Reference. Speech Acts.

Abstract

In this paper I discuss Donnellan’s claim of the pragmatic ambiguity of the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite des-criptions. The literature on the topic is huge and full of alternative analysis. I will restrict myself to a very classical topos: the challenge posed by Kripke to Donnellan’s distinction with the case of a dialogue on an attempt to update a misdescription. I claim that to treat the problem of the referential use of definite descriptions we need not only to take into account the context of utterance, but also the cognitive context with its epistemic restrictions and the possible different contexts of reception of the same utterance. I try to show different aspects of what can be called “pragmatic ambiguity”, which seem not correctly considered by Kripke, and connect them to the basic tenets of Grice Cooperative principle.

 

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Author Biography

  • Carlo Penco, Universidade de Genova

    Professor do departamento de filosofia, Universidade de Genova, Itália.

References

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Published

2019-06-03

How to Cite

PENCO, Carlo. Pragmatic ambiguity and Kripke’s dialogue against Donnellan. Revista Ágora Filosófica, Recife, PE, Brasil, v. 19, n. 1, p. 103–134, 2019. DOI: 10.25247/P1982-999X.2019.v19n1.p103-134. Disponível em: https://www1.unicap.br/ojs/index.php/agora/article/view/1418.. Acesso em: 3 jul. 2024.

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