Ambiguidade Pragmática e o diálogo de Kripke contra Donnellan

Autores

  • Carlo Penco University of Genova

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25247/P1982-999X.2019.v19n1.p103-134

Palavras-chave:

Asserção. Princípio da Caridade. Descrições Definidas. Referência. Atos de Fala.

Resumo

Neste artigo, discutimos a alegação de Donnellan da ambiguidade pragmática da distinção entre usos referenciais e atributivos de descrições definidas. A literatura sobre o tema é enorme e cheia de análises alternativas. Restringir-nos-emos a um topos muito clássico: o desafio proposto por Kripke à distinção de Donnellan com o caso de um diálogo sobre uma tentativa de atualizar uma descrição errada. Afir-mamos que, para tratar o pro-blema do uso referencial das descrições definidas, precisamos não apenas levar em conta o contexto do enunciado, mas também o contexto cognitivo com suas restrições epistê-micas e os possíveis diferentes contextos de recepção do mesmo enunciado. Tentaremos mostrar dife-rentes aspectos do que pode ser cha-mado de “ambiguidade prag-mática”, que parecem não ser corre-tamente considerados por Kripke, e conectá-los aos princípios básicos do princípio Cooperativo de Grice.

Downloads

Os dados de download ainda não estão disponíveis.

Biografia do Autor

  • Carlo Penco, University of Genova

    After my dissertation on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics at the University of Genoa (with Evandro Agazzi) I have studied at Cambridge with Timothy J. Smiley and at Oxford with Sir Michael Dummett, of whom I have edited, and translated into Italian, his book on Frege's philosophy of language. I have been teaching Philosophy of Science at the University of Lecce (Italy)  and  I am now teaching Philosophy of Language and Theories of Communicaton  at the University of Genoa, where I am the Director  of the Master in Philosophy (Laurea Magistrale)  and of the Northwestern Italian Philosophy Consortium (FINO).  I have been Visiting at the University of Iceland at Reykjavik , at the University of Barcelona, at King's College (London), at the University of Pittsburgh, at the Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science and at the Institute of Philosophy (London).

    My main research areas are in Philosophy of Language, Foundations of Cognitive Science and Theory of Communication. I am working now on topics in pragmatics and contextualism (definite descriptions, indexicals). Recent publications include papers on Lecture Notes in AI, History and Philosophy of Logic, History of modern Logic, Philosophical Investigations, Pragmatics and Cognition, Theoria, a contribution to the volume on Dummett on the  Library of Living Philosophers, and a new italian  edition of Frege's Logical Writings.  I am on the editorial board of Epistemologia and of the European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, and have been in the Steering Commettee of SIFA (Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy, of which I have been President in 2002-2004), of ESAP (European Society for Analytic Philosophy) and of SILF (Italian Society for Logic and the Philosophy of Science).

Referências

Bach K. 2007, “Referentially used Descriptions: a Reply to Devitt”, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 3/2: 33-48.

Benzi M.; Penco C. “Defeasible Arguments and Context Dependence” in Paradigmi, 36/3: 561-577

Bezuidenhout M. and Reimer M. 2004 (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond, Oxford, Oxford U.P.

Brandom R., 1994, Making it Explicit, Haervard, Harvard University Press,

Buchanan R., Ostertag G. 2005, “Has the Problem of Incompletness Rested on a Mistake?”, Mind, vol.114, 456 (889-913).

Capuano A. 2016, “A New Account of the Referential/Attributive Distinction and its Semantic Nature”, in Bianchi A., Morato V., and Spolaore G., eds., The Importance of Being Called Ernesto. Reference, Truth, and Logical Form, Padova: University Press.

Devitt, M., 2004, “The case for referential descriptions”, in Bezuidenhout M. and Reimer M.: 280-305.

Donnellan K. 1966, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”, Philosophical Review, 75 (261-230).

Kaplan D. 2005, “Reading ‘On Denoting’ on its centenary”, Mind, 114/456: 933-1003.

Korta K. and Perry J. 2011, Critical Pragmatics: An inquiry into Reference and Communication, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kripke S. 1975, “Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference”, in French P.A., Uehling T.E., Wettstein H.K. (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, Univ. of Minnesota Press.

Kripke S. 2005, “Russell's notion of Scope”, Mind, vol.114, 456 (1005-1037).

Linsky L. 1963, “Reference and Referents”, in Caton C. (ed.), Philosophy and Ordinary Language, Urbana.

Liston M. 2007 (ed.) European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, issue on “Descriptions, their content, uses, and historical significance”, 3/2

Neale S. 2004, “This, That, and the Other”, in Bezuidenhout M. and Reimer M.: 68-182.

Neale S. 2005 “A century Later”, introduction to Mind, 114/456: 809–871

Neale S. 2006, "Descriptions", in M. Devitt - R. Hanley (eds), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language.

Neale S. 2016, “Silent Refernce”, in G. Ostertag, (ed.) Meanings and Other Things: Essays in Honor of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford Univ Pres, p. 229-344.

Penco C. 2010, “Essentially Incomplete Descriptions”, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 6: 47.66.

Penco C. 2017, “Donnellan’s misdescriptions and Loose Talk”, in Maria Ponte & Kepa Korta editors, Reference and Representation in Language and Thought, Oxford U.P.

Predelli S. Schiffer S. 1995 “Descriptions, Indexicals and Belief Reports”, Mind, 104 (107-131).

Soames S. 2005 “Why Incomplete Definite Descriptions do not Defeat Russell’s Theory of Descriptions”, in Teorema, Vol. XXIV/3: 7-30

Stalnaker R. 1970, “Pragmatics”, in Synthese 22: 272-289.

Publicado

2019-06-03

Como Citar

PENCO, Carlo. Ambiguidade Pragmática e o diálogo de Kripke contra Donnellan. Revista Ágora Filosófica, Recife, PE, Brasil, v. 19, n. 1, p. 103–134, 2019. DOI: 10.25247/P1982-999X.2019.v19n1.p103-134. Disponível em: https://www1.unicap.br/ojs/index.php/agora/article/view/1418.. Acesso em: 23 nov. 2024.

Artigos Semelhantes

1-10 de 18

Você também pode iniciar uma pesquisa avançada por similaridade para este artigo.