Rationality and Rhetoric in Aristotle

Abstract

When we admit that what we call rationality identifies with the genres of discursivity (lógos), such rationality can be re-known through formal analysis of the constitutive elements proper to each sphere of discursive rationality (lógos). In the case of rhetorical art (rethorikê), the matter of discourse, that is, words (lógoi), are ordered in view of the production (poiésis) of an "effect" (érgon), which is identified with persuasion (peithós), strictly linked to particular contexts or concrete cases. In this sense, the understanding and practice of "proofs" (písteis) according to an adequate form (êidos), which consists of (i) the reasoning (lógos) inherent in the discourse is crucial; (ii) "character" (éthos) or "good reputation" of the orator - considered as motor (or efficient) cause of rhetorical discourse; and (3) the páthos, that is, the passions or emotions aroused through discourse. Thus, "persuasion tests" (písteis) can be classified as logical, ethical or emotional (pathetic) evidence. Aristotle distinguishes between artistic proofs, that is, intrinsic (or technical) proofs, and non-artistic, extrinsic (or non-technical) proofs, that is, obtained in a way unrelated to rhetorical art (rethorikê); while the "artistic" or technical proofs refer to those proofs obtained through rules or "ways" (méthodoi) proper to rhetoric (rethorikê), understood as art (techné) of production (poiésis) of discourses (lógoi) that aim at persuasion (peithós). Therefore, rhetoric (rethorikê) points to a specific genre of art, which - in turn - focuses on a specific genre of discursive rationality (lógos), so that it presents itself as a kind of "knowing" (epistême). Thus, it remains to analyze whether such rationality inherent in this kind of discursivity (lógos) is similar to the method (méthodos) proper of rhetoric, re-known as a kind of knowledge (epistême).