Between the rigidity and the rigor of the concept

a critique of the reductive theoretical discourse

Abstract

Unwavering confidence in the concept as an exact and sufficient expression of phenomena is one of the most recurring tendencies in the rationalist and systematizing tradition of Western thought. By prioritizing conceptual formalization as a self-sufficient tool for understanding reality, the risk of reducing the multiplicity of experiences to rigid and limiting structures is all the more detrimental to knowledge as a means of distorting truths. With the aim of promoting self-criticism in the areas of knowledge, in the formation of consciousness, in scientific practices, and in philosophical reflections, so that the act of conceptualizing is less an end in itself than a means by which thought is reworked, this article discusses the epistemological problems arising from this stance through a qualitative approach to theoretical review, analyzing how the absolutization of the concept can produce simplifications, obscure the dynamics of lived experience, and establish an artificial distance between knowledge and reality. Its main argument is that the concept, although indispensable to the organization of thought, must be understood as a provisional and open instrument. Thus, both conceptualizing subjects and their formulations must be capable of engaging with the unpredictability and uncertainty of phenomena, so that, as a result of this dialogue, the concept is recognized as a mediator, not as a reflection of reality.