Nomes Ficcionais e Nomes Vazios: Crítica à Teoria da Referência sem Referentes de Mark Sainsbury
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.25247/P1982-999X.2019.v19n1.p78-102Keywords:
Nomes ficcionais. Nomes vazios. Referência. Metafísica. Semântica.Abstract
Mark Sainsbury apresentou através da sua teoria da Referência sem Referentes (RSR) um caminho intermediário entre a teoria da referência direta de Stuart Mill e o descritivismo de Frege. A maior virtude da RSR é que ela permite que expressões que contêm nomes vazios (como ‘Vulcano é um planeta que orbita entre o sol e Mercúrio’) sejam ao mesmo tempo inteligíveis e passíveis de ser valoradas como verdadeiras ou falsas. Por outro lado, a partir da distinção que François Recanati (2018) estabelece entre declarações ficcio-nais, metaficcionais e paraficcionais, o objetivo neste artigo é o de argumen-tar que a RSR gera valores de verdade indesejados para as declarações que contêm nomes ficcionais. Como proposta para lidar com o problema, lançamos as linhas gerais da teoria artefactual de Amie Thomasson (1999) e da teoria dos dois modos de predicação de Peter van Inwagen (1977/1983) e Edward Zalta (1983) de modo que os nomes ficcionais são genuínos e referentes a artefatos abstratos.
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