Structure, Universe of Discourse, and Function of Interpretation

The Theory of Truth as Correspondence in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Abstract

The present article aims to examine the relationship between the concepts of structure, universe of discourse, and function of interpretation within the scope of formal logic, and their articulation with the theory of truth as correspondence, as presented by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It seeks to show how these concepts delimit the scope and applicability of propositions, defining their semantic boundaries and their correspondence with reality. The theoretical framework is based on the philosophical tradition that includes Russell and Wittgenstein, as well as logicians such as Haack and Mortari, and commentators on Wittgenstein, analyzed especially in the context of logical atomism and the pictorial theory of the proposition — according to which language is a depiction of the world, sharing with it a logical form that allows for the verification of the truth or falsity of propositions, a cornerstone of any theory of truth. Methodologically, the study adopts a conceptual and interpretative analysis, confronting passages from the Tractatus with central notions of formal logic. The research also comparatively addresses Wittgenstein’s position in his early phase regarding the investigated theory, in relation to other philosophers, including, for example, Austin and Wittgenstein himself in his later phase. The conclusions indicate that, for Wittgenstein, the truth of a proposition depends on its structural correspondence with a state of affairs in the world, thereby defining the limits of what can be said meaningfully. Language mirrors reality only within these limits. This perspective emphasizes the importance of a rigorous logical relationship between language and reality and remains relevant to contemporary philosophy, as it highlights both the power and the limits of linguistic representation.